

1 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION
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SUBJECT: GHE Evaluation of [REDACTED] View of Current Soviet
Objectives and Intentions

Reference: Memorandum, 21 July 1950, to DCI from AD/OPC

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1. The views which [REDACTED] expressed throughout the interview probably represent his own thinking, and conform with official Yugoslav views.

2. a. The views expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 regarding Soviet desires to isolate the Chinese Communists from Tito and the West, and to keep China from assuming independent leadership in the Far East, constitute a reasonable explanation of Soviet policy in the Far East during the past nine months. There is, however, no reliable evidence to indicate that the Soviets deliberately adopted such a policy.

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b. The analogy drawn by [REDACTED] between the conditions which brought about nationalist communism in Yugoslavia and existing conditions in China and Indochina (paragraph 1) is sound. A similar break between China and the USSR would be contingent upon the efficiency of Soviet control and on the skill with which the USSR conducted its relations with Peiping. At the moment there are no outward signs of serious dissension or of clumsy Soviet pressure.

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c. It is doubted that the USSR does not want China admitted to the UN, as [REDACTED] believes. A more probable statement of the Soviet position is that it desires the admission of the Chinese Communists, but hopes to attain this end under conditions which will demonstrate that the USSR alone was responsible for it despite the opposition of the western powers.

d. It is also doubted that the USSR sought to provide US protection of Formosa. The USSR probably calculated merely that such a US step might be taken, and was prepared to capitalize on it if it took place.

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3. [REDACTED] position, as expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4, is consistent with the views he has expressed to members of the US UN delegation. There is no conclusive evidence that the Yugoslav Government has accepted his views.

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4. [REDACTED] belief that there probably will not be a resumption of Greek guerrilla activities is considered correct. Logistical difficulties and Greek regular army strength would make such a resumption a very bad military risk for the Communists and would hinder, if not halt, Greek Communism's current campaign to widen its popular base of support in the country.

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ORE: [REDACTED]:fd
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